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Is the IDC living off its industrial inheritance?

IDC CEO Mmakgoshi Lekhethe.
IDC CEO Mmakgoshi Lekhethe. Picture: IDC Instagram

THE Industrial Development Corporation (IDC) on Tuesday announced the early departure of CEO Mmakgoshi Lekhethe, two months after announcing the exit of CFO Isaac Malevu, which raises a huge question: has the organisation become another in a long list of South African corporate achievements shattered by inept leaders, political interference and South Africa’s declining industrial base?

And how much longer can an institution that helped build South Africa’s industrial economy rely on that achievement to excuse its performance while it’s buckling under the burden of becoming a kind of lender of last resort to declining industries rather than a creator of new industrial prowess?

Lekhethe, appointed in February 2025, is due to leave on February 28 2027 under a mutual separation agreement about two years into a five-year contract. Chief risk officer Mpho Kubelo will take over on an interim basis. The departure of the CEO and CFO comes at an uncomfortable moment.

The IDC group lost R4.65bn in the year to March 2026, following a R329m profit in 2025 and about R7.5bn in 2024. Its accounts also required significant corrections and prior-year restatements. The final audit opinion was unqualified, but getting the accounts into an acceptable state required adjustments, while the auditors identified weaknesses in financial reporting controls.

An unqualified audit is welcome and there are important qualifications. The IDC company, as distinct from the consolidated group containing its subsidiaries, made R2.3bn and reported equity of R98.6bn. This is no insolvent shell. But the crucial number is this: its nonperforming loan ratio is 35.1%, an improvement from 41.7% but still frighteningly high.

In the latest results, the group result was weighed down by Foskor’s R2.8bn loss, including a R1.6bn deferred-tax asset impairment, and losses among associates, notably Mozal. Five borrowers accounted for R12.4bn, or about half, of nonperforming loans. Much of the trouble is concentrated, persistent and old.

These distinctions matter because the IDC is not simply a department distributing a fresh annual allocation from the National Treasury. Its model depends on investment income, repayments, asset realisations and its ability to borrow. Money that does not come back cannot readily finance the next factory. Persistent losses and impaired investments consume the capacity to take the next worthwhile industrial risk.

The danger is therefore more subtle than an imminent bailout. A development financier can remain impressively wealthy while becoming progressively less effective, living on the assets accumulated by previous generations and spending increasing amounts of energy managing the disappointments of its own.

The contrast with its history is striking. Established in 1940, the IDC helped finance the industrial architecture of modern South Africa, with a record encompassing Sasol, Foskor, Sappi and Safmarine. These were investments with consequences well beyond their own balance sheets: chemical production, fertiliser, paper, shipping, industrial capabilities and supply chains.

The old IDC did operate in a siege economy and served political objectives of its own. It was never a monastery of disinterested capitalism. Nor did every megaproject succeed. Indeed, Foskor’s present difficulties are an awkward reminder that yesterday’s strategic triumph can become today’s financial burden.

Nevertheless, there was an intelligible organising ambition: create productive capacity on a scale capable of changing the economy.

A shift in focus

More recently, another objective became increasingly prominent: change the ownership of that economy. Black empowerment, support for women and young entrepreneurs, smaller enterprises, regional development and employment preservation became increasingly important measures of institutional achievement. But a development lender still has to decide what happens when these objectives conflict with commercial judgement. A worthy beneficiary cannot make an uncompetitive factory competitive.

The Black Industrialists Policy, approved in 2015, crystallised the change. Its stated ambition was more substantial than distributing passive stakes in established companies: it sought black ownership and control of productive enterprises. The IDC introduced a specific funding target for black industrialists in 2015, and transformation targets widened the institution’s obligations.

Its subsequent transformation mandate addressed an economy in which businesses complained, with some justification, that their access to ownership and finance had been heavily restricted. But the change in the IDC was nevertheless substantial: the identity of owners, the distribution of opportunities and the preservation of employment became explicit investment objectives alongside the development of industrial capacity.

In 2015, the IDC introduced a specific target for black industrialist funding. The cabinet approved the Black Industrialists Policy that year, and the government set transformation targets covering black industrialists and women- and youth-empowered businesses. The policy sought active ownership and control of productive enterprises, rather than passive minority shareholdings in established companies.

By April 2026, the IDC said about 60% of its book supported black-owned or black-empowered businesses. Small business funding has also expanded, although it remains a minority of disbursements. The latest presentation records R1.3bn for SMMEs against R17bn in on-balance-sheet disbursements overall.

The change has therefore not been a wholesale retreat from large projects. It has involved financing new owners within large projects as well as financing new businesses. The financial consequences depend on the projects selected, the price and structure of the funding, and the ability of borrowers to repay.

However, one example, Kalagadi Manganese, illustrates the scale of the exposure that can result.

Founded by Daphne Mashile-Nkosi, Kalagadi combined black woman ownership with the industrial policy objective of processing manganese locally. The IDC became both a lender and a 20% shareholder. A parliamentary disclosure records R6.1bn in IDC funding received by Kalagadi between June 2013 and March 2025. Reporting on the latest accounts puts its debt to the IDC at about R8.8bn.

The IDC applied to place Kalagadi in business rescue in May 2020. Six years later, the dispute remains unresolved. Kalagadi has maintained that it is solvent and has sought a restructuring of its debt. In 2024, the IDC’s position was that the company was paying trade creditors while failing to service its lenders.

The R8.8bn debt balance is not equivalent to an established final loss, and accumulated interest means it cannot be treated as the amount of fresh cash advanced. It does, however, represent a substantial exposure whose recovery has involved prolonged litigation. The IDC has been a shareholder as well as a creditor throughout the dispute.

Gupta ghosts

The Gupta-linked Oakbay and Shiva Uranium investment presents a different record.

The IDC advanced R250m in 2010 towards the acquisition of the uranium business. In 2014, part of the financing relationship was restructured through the conversion of interest into Oakbay shares. The IDC subsequently sought repayment through the courts.

Its R287.5m claim comprised R37.5m in outstanding principal and R250m in disputed interest, according to reporting at the time that proceedings were launched. By 2022, recovery efforts were still reported as stalled. The public material reviewed does not establish the final amount ultimately recovered. But the investment does illustrate how politically malleable the IDC has become.

This was a direct financial relationship with the Gupta business group, rather than an inference drawn from overlapping acquaintances or board memberships. It also left the IDC exposed through both lending and equity. The record raises questions about its assessment of the counterparties and the subsequent restructuring, independently of the broader debate about empowerment policy.

The recent disclosure of R23.4bn associated with 48 black industrialists provides a more current view of the portfolio, although the headline figure has frequently been misdescribed.

The recent answer to a parliamentary question identifies R6.62bn in direct IDC funding and about R678m managed by the IDC for other entities. Shareholders contributed about R4bn, other development financiers R797m and other funders, including commercial banks, R11.39bn. At the time of the answer, R4.7bn of the direct IDC funding had been disbursed.

The list includes three entities about which the public record places question marks: Bongani Rainmaker, SuperChicks Hatchery and three Reatile-associated wind projects. They raise different issues and cannot be grouped together as failed investments.

SuperChicks identifies KP Matshidze as its co-founder and CEO. The Council for Medical Schemes (CMS) disclosures concerning former acting registrar Patrick Matshidze record a matter that would warrant examination in a background assessment.

In its account of the Community Medical Aid Scheme investigation, the CMS said a R14.5m contract had been paid in full before commencement and without deliverables. It said Matshidze had undisclosed business relationships with individuals implicated in the contract’s irregular award. The inspection report was handed to police, and the CMS said the National Prosecuting Authority was pursuing the matter.

These statements concern the earlier medical schemes matter, not conduct by SuperChicks. What remains unclear is how the IDC assessed that history, what explanation it received and whether it established the outcome of the investigation before providing finance.

Bongani Rainmaker is listed with R200m in total funding facilitated. In October, Newsday reported concerns about a R7.2bn Gauteng education procurement arrangement involving Bongani Rainmaker Logistics. The report cited the DA’s Michael Waters and audit findings concerning the assessment of minimum personnel requirements during procurement.

The reported irregularity does not establish that R7.2bn was stolen or lost. For a lender, however, the security of major public contracts is relevant to projected revenue and repayment capacity. Establishing the relationship between the named IDC borrower and the contracting company, the timing of the financing and the IDC’s assessment of procurement risk would clarify the exposure. There is no established evidence in the material reviewed that either Bongani or SuperChicks has defaulted on the IDC.

The old IDC did operate in a siege economy and served political objectives of its own. It was never a monastery of disinterested capitalism

The real biggie is Reatile’s wind investments, which involve much larger projects and a different set of governance questions.

Semi-retired consultant and construction industry veteran Chris Botha, writing on LinkedIn, notes that the three projects account for about R13.2bn, or 56%, of the R23.4bn list. A separate parliamentary answer records IDC funding of R426m for Reatile Renewables Ishwati, R353m for Khangela and R351m for Sibanye-uMsinde, totalling R1.13bn. The IDC’s legal advisers describe the financing as supporting Reatile’s equity contributions to three 140MW wind farms.

Reatile has publicly disputed suggestions that it received R13.2bn from the IDC. It says most of the funding came from commercial banks and has argued that the IDC should provide more support for transformation.

AIIM, part of Old Mutual Alternative Investments, identifies Reatile as a co-investor alongside its IDEAS Fund in Khangela and Umsinde Emoyeni. The projects have 20-year power-purchase agreements supplying Richards Bay Minerals and Sibanye-Stillwater. Rand Merchant Bank was the sole mandated lead arranger for those two projects.

This is all good and well, but Botha also identifies overlapping board and business relationships. Sizeka Magwentshu-Rensburg served as Old Mutual’s lead independent director and chaired the IDC’s investments committee. She retired from the IDC board effective September 1 2025. Brian Dames, CEO of African Rainbow Energy & Power (AREP), returned to the IDC board in October 2025 after a brief departure.

AREP is associated with Patrice Motsepe, President Cyril Ramaphosa’s brother-in-law. The overlap between Old Mutual and the IDC is more directly relevant to the project structures. Whether it created a conflict in an individual decision depends on approval dates, committee participation and declarations of interest. The IDC’s 2024 annual report records that Dames recused himself from two meetings because of declared conflicts, demonstrating that recusals do occur. It does not establish how the Reatile approvals were handled.

Botha is not alleging that the projects are financially questionable, but he is suggesting that the IDC should be publishing relevant conflict declarations, recusal records and lending terms. Those records would allow an assessment of the decisions beyond the existence of overlapping directorships. But it does draw a line between politics and investment.

Reatile has also been selected as the empowerment partner in ADNOC’s proposed R16bn acquisition of Shell’s South African downstream business. Its precise stake was not disclosed in the reporting reviewed. Its participation in several large transactions shows the importance of established investment groups within the empowerment programme; it does not, on its own, demonstrate improper preference.

It’s not that the IDC’s investments in the modern era have not produced some notable winners. At Kenhardt in the Northern Cape, the IDC, British International Investment and Norfund helped finance H1 Holdings’ participation alongside Scatec in a solar and battery project. The facility combines 540MW of solar generation with 1,140MWh of battery storage and supplies 150MW of dispatchable electricity daily from 5am to 9.30pm.

In September 2025, H1 announced a R1.92bn refinancing with Standard Bank that enabled the development financiers to exit. H1 said R1.9bn was returned to the investors collectively, delivering strong returns and releasing capital for further investment. The IDC’s individual return was not disclosed.

Kenhardt combines substantial new generating capacity, black ownership and repayment of development capital through commercial refinancing. It provides evidence that the IDC remains capable of supporting significant projects, and that empowerment financing can be commercially successful.

The available disclosures do not establish whether empowerment investments, as a class, have performed worse than comparable investments elsewhere in the portfolio. But the financial record does support a narrower concern.

The IDC has a large capital base and continuing investment capacity, but also substantial nonperforming exposures, several extending beyond 15 years, and recent weaknesses in its own financial reporting. The next CEO will inherit both.

Recoveries from the existing portfolio, returns on newer investments and the reliability of reported values will give a clearer indication of the institution’s performance than another announcement of funding commitments.

The obvious underlying problem is that the IDC is increasingly being called on to support troubled investments rather than focusing on innovation and the creation of new investment. Its disclosed lending to ArcelorMittal South Africa reached R2.77bn, much of it intended to defer the closure of the long-steel operations.

At Tongaat Hulett, R2.5bn in distress funding was earmarked for conversion into equity. The IDC’s corporate plan identifies turnaround milestones for five significant investments: Cast Products South Africa, Foskor, BAIC, ArcelorMittal South Africa and Kalagadi.

These interventions may preserve industrial capacity, but they also commit capital and management resources to existing problems. The IDC does not provide a sufficiently clear breakdown to establish how much this reduces its capacity to fund new projects — or even what they might be.

But one thing is unmissable: gradually, as time moves on and South Africa’s manufacturing base declines, the legacy of an institution that once created great lasting industries is fading.

This article first appeared in the FM.